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under the assumption that consumers have rational expectations 
on future prices. For a wide variety of expectations, optimale consumption plans result in sticky-price demand functions. Market 
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1. INTROPUCTION 
e 
The purpose of this paper is to study price dynamics in a 
durable good market under the assumption that consumers have 
rational expectations on future prices. We find that, for a 
e 
wide variety of expectations, the price of a durable good will 
not adjust instantaneously to its long-run equilibrium level. 
This provides a foundation for sticky-price demand functions 
similar to those studied in Fershtman and Kamien (1987), Miller 
(1979), Roos (1925), and Evans (1924), among others1 • Market 
equilibria are analized under two alternative assumptions on 
CI the structure of the market: perfect competition and 
oligopolistic competition. 
In addition to current prices and income, the demand for 
C 
a durable good is likely to depend on some other factors. 
First, the stock of the good held at any particular date may 
I 
I 
I influence consumers' willingness to buy new units. Thus, it isle 
posible for demand functions (and prices) to change over time. 
Second, if prices are expected to change in the future, 
consumers may benefit from either anticipating or delaying 
e 
some of their purchases¡ in consequence, the demand of the good 
will depend on consumers'expectations on future prices. 
We develop a model of consumer's choice to characterize 
e 
dynamic demand equations for durable goods2 which are 
intertemporally consistent with consumers' expectations and 
preferences. This is done for sets of expectations satisfying 
;c
I
i 
certain smoothness requirements. We then show that these 
expectations are fulfilled in equilibrium • 
e 
1 
e 
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e The literature on market dynamics with sticky prices is 
based on the assumption that prices do not adjust 
instantaneously to long-run equilibrium levels. It is unclear, 
c: however, the economic motivation for the existence of 
adjustment lags. Fershtman and Kamien (1987) propose utility 
functions that depend on both current consumption and past 
e consumption of a good. static demand functions, resulting from 
myopic utility maximization, show gradual price adjustment in 
this case. 
e Our model extends the analysis of Fershtman and Kamien 
(1987) to the case in which consumers have rational 
expectations on future prices. We have chosen to develop the 
e model in terms of a good of some (possibly limited) durability. 
An alternative formulation, based on preferences that depend 
on both current consumption and past consumption of a good, can 
also be developed. Indeed, it is possible to show that formally 
the analysis of both models is identical3 • 
Myopic and anticipatory behavior result in different 
e demands. In periods of declining prices, for instance, 
consumers demand less if they anticipate future prices than 
if they behave myopically. Thus, sophisticated consumers will 
C delay some of their purchases in anticipation of future lower 
prices. The inequality is reversed in periods of increasing 
prices. 
C The implication is that models built on the asumption of 
a static demand will tend to make biased predictions as long 
as: i) the good has some durability¡ and ii) its price changes 
e through time. In periods of declining prices, for example, 
2 
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e 
( prices will be below the static equilibrium price (for a given 
stock level). 
The existence and properties of equilibria with rational 
e expectations is examined under two different assumptions on the 
structure of the market. First, we consider the case of a 
competitive market with general cost and utility functions. 
e Second, we adopt a differential game framework to analize a 
particular example of an oligopolistic market. 
Market dynamics are similar in both cases. First, price 
e shows a tendency to change through time in a gradual fashion. 
Second, price and stock of the durable good converge to a 
steady-state. Third, along the equilibrium path, price and 
e stock show an inverse relation. This last result replicates the 
common observation that new (durable) goods are introduced at 
a relatively high price which declines through time, as the 
e 
stock of the good in the market increases. 
An inverse relation between price and stock is also 
predicted by models of learning-by-doing, Spence(1981). The 
c: force driving price down in models of learning-by-doing is the 
sequential reduction of (marginal) costs. In our model price 
falls for a different reason. Assume that the marginal utility 
e of the durable good is decreasing. Then, consumers' willingness 
to pay will decrease as their stock of the good increases. In 
equilibrium, the price path is adapted to the changing 
e willingness to pay of the consumers. Thus, gradual price 
reduction in our model occurs as a form of intertemporal price 
discrimination¡ see Stokey (1979) for a discusion of 
e intertemporal price discrimination in a monopolistic market. 
3 
.c 
I 
Even if all of the consumers are identical, price 
e 
discrimination is imperfect¡ in intervals of declining price, 
for instance, the price will be below the maximum price a 
consumer would be willing to pay should price remain constant. 
( 
In this way, buyers are induced to increase their holdings of 
the good. 
Finally, we analize some comparative dynamic properties of 
e 
the modelo Suppose an unexpected shock changes any of the 
structural parameters of the modelo How will price react to 
this shock? We find that the answer depends on whether the 
e 
supply side or the demand side of the market is affected by the 
shock. Assume that the market was in a steady state equilibrium 
before the shock. The adjustment of price occurs in two stages. 
e 
First, there is an instantaneous adjustment: the price jumps 
to the equilibrium level required by the current stock of the 
good . Second, the adjustment is completed by a gradual change, 
e 
as price continuously adjusts to the changing stock level. 
Supply shocks result in the price jump and the gradual 
adjustment running in the same direction. Thus, in the short-
e 
run price under-reacts to unexpected changes in costs or in the 
number of firms in the market. Demand shocks, on the other 
hand, result in the price jump and the gradual adjustment 
e 
running in opposite directions. Thus, in the short-run price 
over-reacts to unexpected demand changes. We refer to these two 
cases as price undershooting and price overshooting, 
respectively. In both cases, short-run price changes are not 
proportionate to the long-run effect of the shock on the 
equilibrium price. 
e 
4 
( 
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
presents the demand side of the model and compares myopic and 
anticipatory consumer's behavior. section 3 studies equilibrium 
c: market dynamics under perfect competition. In section 4, a 
differential game framework is adopted to analize the case of 
an oligopolistic market. Section 5 discuss sorne comparative 
e dynamics of the modelo Finally, section 6 contains sorne 
concluding remarks. 
e 
2. THE DEMAND SIDE 
Consider a durable good X which depretiates at a constant 
( rate g. Let tE [0,00) denote time. Consumers of the good are 
identical4 and infinitely lived¡ and there is a total of N 
consumers. Let X(t) ~O be the stock of the good owned by a 
e consumer at time t. The rate of change of the stock is: 
(1) X' (t)=x(t)-gX(t) g~O 
( 
where x(t)~O is the consumer's demand of the durable good at 
time t. 
e Let p(t) be the price of X at t. The utility rate is 
assumed to depend on the stock of the good and on the 
expenditures incurred in new purchasess: 
e 
(2) U(X, px)=u(X)-px 
( 
5 
where u( is twice continuously differentiable, strictly 
increasing and strictly concave. utility is discounted at rate 
r>O over the infinite time horizon. 
Suppose a consumer expects price to follow a piecewise 
continuous path {p(t) :tE [O,oo)}. Then, an optimal purchase plan 
x·(t) will be chosen to maximize: 
(3) 
subject to (1) and the non-negativity constraint x(t)~O. 
optimal purchasing plans are characterized in the following: 
e LEMMA 1: Suppose that the expected 
continuously 
satisfies: 
differentiable. Then, 
price path is 
individual 
twice 
demand 
e 
(4) x(t)=max{O,gX(t)+[(r+g)p'(t)-p"(t)]/u"(X(t»} 
PROOF: See Appendix A.III. 
e 
When the lower bound on x(t) is not binding, i.e., when 
consumers are active in the market, integration of (4) yields: 
(5) p'(t)=(r+g)p(t)-u'(X(t» 
e 
e 
which can be regarded as the dynamic demand equation for an 
active consumero Notice that, for the set of expectations under 
consideration, demand depends on "local" information only. The 
6 
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stock of the good that the consumer wants to held is determined 
by the current price of the good and its current rate of 
change. 
Myopic demand levels will be used as a benchmark. A myopic 
consumer is defined as one who does not anticipate future 
changes in the price of the good. Thus, a myopic consumer will 
demand units of the good up to the point in which (total 
discounted) marginal utility equals the current price p(t) of 
the good: 
(6) u'(X(t))/(r+g)=p(t) 
Given a price p, the solution X(t) of (6) will be referred to 
as the myopic stock demand and denoted X.(p) . 
The behavioral consequences of consumers expectations are 
summarized as follows: 
PROPOSITION 1: Suppose that consumers are active at time t and 
price p. Then, the optimal amount of stock X· satisfies: i) 
X·>X.(p) if price is expected to rise; ii) X·<X.(p) if price is 
expected to decline; and iii) X·=X.(p) if price is expected to 
remain constant. 
PROOF: simply notice that equations (5) and (6) are identical 
for p' (t)=O. Hence, iii) follows. If p'(t»O, then 
u'(X·)<u'(Xm(p)), which implies i) since u( ) is concave. ii) 
follows similarly.///. 
7 
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Intuitively, proposition 1 indicates that if the price of 
the good is expected to decline, then it is optimal to delay 
the purchase of some units of the good to take advantage of 
c: 
future lower prices¡ and the converse holds true if the price 
of the good is expected to raise. 
In summary, we have found that demand functions showing 
e 
gradual price adjustment can be rationalized as demand 
functions for a durable good6 • Furthermore, the static 
optimization rule, setting the stock level so that marginal 
( 
utility equals price, is not optimal in this context¡ utility 
maximizing behavior requires to adapt current demand to 
expected future prices. 
e 
Finally, market demand can be obtained from equation (4). 
Notice that, as long as consumers' expectations are rational, 
the same price path is anticipated by every consumero 
c: 
Therefore, market demand is simply Xm(t)= Nx(t). 
3. PERFECT COMPETITION 
( 
The results of the previous section are valid only if the set 
of expectations considered is consistent with the actual 
equilibrium behavior of price. We consider in this section the 
case of a perfectly competitive market to show that the 
dynamic demand equation (5) is indeed consistent with 
( equilibrium dynamics. 
Let c(q) be the cost of producing q units of the good, and 
suppose that c( ) is twice differentiable, strictly increasing 
e 
8 
e 
( 
and concave, and lilnq_>ooc' (q) =00. Furthermore, c' (O) <u' (O) , 
e 
since otherwise the market will never be active. 
There are n identical firms. Price-taking behavior implies 
that each firm's supply will satisfy: 
( 
(7) p(t)=c'(q(t» 
e 
Let's define a function b( ) as the inverse of the marginal 
cost, i.e., c'(b(z»=z for every z~O. Then, market supply at 
time t is qm(p(t»=nb(p(t». Let Q(t) be the total stock of the 
( 
good in the hands of the consumers at time t. The rate of 
change of Q(t) satisfies: 
e (8) Q'(t)= qm(p(t»-gQ(t) 
A competitive equilibrium with rational expectations is a 
e 
path of prices and stock (p(t),Q(t», and a pair of demand and 
supply functions (Xm(t), qm(t», satisfying the following 
conditions: 
( 
i) Each consumer correctly anticipates the price path. 
ii) Supply equals demand for every t, i.e., Xm(t)=qm(p(t». 
iii) The rates of change of price and stock satisfy the dynamic 
( 
demand equation (5) and equation (8) simultaneously. 
The dynamic properties of the equilibrium are characterized 
in the following: 
( 
e 
9 
,. 
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PROPOSITION 2: i) There exists a unique steady state 
equilibrium (P.,O.); ii) given Oo=O(O)~O, there exists a price 
Po such that the resulting equilibrium path of price and stock 
(p-(t) ,O-(t)) converges to the steady state; and iii) along the( 
equilibrium path, price and stock are inversely related, i.e., 
price declines as the stock level increases and viceversa. 
PROOF: i) The solution (PilO.) of b(p.)=gO. and (r+g)p.=u' (O./N) 
defines a steady-state; hence P. solves P.=u' (b(p.) /N) / (r+g) . 
This equation has a solution since for p=O, 
u'(b(p)/(gN))/(r+g)-p=u'(O)/(r+g»O, while for p-->oo, 
u' (b(p)/(gN))/(r+g)-p-->-oo<O; continuity then requires 
u' (b(p)/(gN))/(r+g)-p=O for some p in between. The solution is 
unique since u'(b(p)/(gN))/(r+g) is (strictly) decreasing. 
ii) First notice that, as long as p>O, supply will be strictly 
positive; hence, demand which equals supply, must also be 
positive; therefore the lower bound on x(t) is not binding for 
positive prices; this implies that the dynamic demand equation 
is consistent with utility maximizing behavior. Suppose 
w.l.o.g. that 0(0)<0•• We have to show that for at least one 
initial price level p(O), the resulting path of price and stock 
L(p(O)) converges to (P.,O.). Notice that any initial condition 
can be continued along a unique solution path. Suppose, to 
obtain a contradiction, that no path L(p(O)) converges to the 
steady-state. Let A=={ (p, O): p' (t) =0, O' (t) >O} and B={ (p, O) : 
r p'(t)<O, O'(t)=O}. Then, there exists a price Pe such that: i) 
if p(O»Pe' then L(p(O)) crosses A; ii) if p(O)<Pe' then L(p(O)) 
crosses B. Furthermore, L(Pe) must cross either A or B at some 
10 
r 
point (PD,QD). In the first case, the set of points A'=An{(p,Q): 
P.<P<PD} is isolated, i.e., an initial condition in A'cannot be 
continued, which is a contradiction. A similar argument applies 
in the second case. 
iii) Notice that, along the equilibrium path, convergence to 
the steady state requires Q'(t»o and p'(t)<o if Q(O)<Q•• The 
inequalities are reversed if Q(O»Q•. ///. 
Figure 1 shows the four posible dynamics of price and 
stock. The only stable path lies in the set {(p,Q): p'(t)SO and 
q' (t) ~O} for stock levels below Q., and in the set {(p,Q): 
p'(t)~O and q'(t)SO} for stock levels above Q•. Proposition 2 
suggests that declining prices will be observed in young 
(durable good) industries under perfect competition; a long run 
equilibrium price will be approached as the industry reaches 
maturity. Furthermore, as price declines and stock increases, 
a larger fraction of total sales is directed to the replacement 
of old units of the good, and a smaller fraction corresponds 
to net increases in the stock held by the consumers. Total 
sales and profits decrease as the price of the good falls. 
4. OLIGOPOLY 
We will consider a dynamic version of a Cournot oligopoly in 
which firms choose output and recognize the influence of 
production decisions on price. Firms are assumed to be 
identical and are indexed by i; there is a total of n firms in 
11 
the market. The production rate of firm i at time t is denoted 
by ~(t). The cost rate satisfies: 
(9) c j(q¡ (t) ) =c [qj (t) ]'
e 
where c>O and s>l. Hence, there are decreasing returns to scale 
in the production technology. The profit rate is: 
(10) f¡ (p (t) , q¡ (t) ) = P (t) qj (t) -Cj (q¡ (t) ) 
Profits are discounted at rate r. Firm's i total discounted 
profits starting at t o are: 
(11) 
At every date t, each firm must choose an output level 
after observing the current levels of price and stock. Each 
firm recognizes the influence of current output decisions on 
future prices¡ the current price, however, is taken as given. 
An strategy for firm i is a piece-wise continuous function 
specifying the output rate, i . e. , 
q¡(t)=JLj(p(t) ,Q(t) ,t). 
An equilibrium with rational expectations is a set of n 
strategies JL¡, one for each firm, together with a price path 
p. (t) such that:  
i) Each consumer correctly anticipates the price path. 
ii) firm's i strategy maximizes (12) starting at O, given the 
other firms'strategies.  
12 
( 
iii) Supply equals demand for every t, i.e., Xm(t)=qm(p(t)). 
iv) The rates of change of price and stock satisfy the dynamic 
demand equation (5) and equation (1) simultaneously. 
An equilibrium is subgame perfect if firm' s i strategy 
maximizes discounted profits starting at t o for any toE[o,~), 
given the other firm's strategies. 
We will be concerned with subgame perfect equilibria 
resulting in a continuous and differentiable price path¡ 
furthermore, we restrict our attention to equilibria in which 
consumers (and firms) are always active and the utility 
function takes the special form u(x)=lnX. For this set of 
equilibria, the change of the price through time is governed 
by: 
(12) p'(t)=(r+g)p(t)-N/Q(t) 
and the change in the total stock obeys: 
(13) Q' (t)=-gQ(t)+I:i=l, ..•nq¡(t) 
Given a set of inicial conditions (p(to) ,Q(to) ,to) , and a set 
of n-1 strategies, the current value of the game for firm i is: 
(14) V*i(p(tO) ,Q(to) )=max{pi(p(to) ,Q(to) ,to)} 
lJ.i 
where p(t) and Q(t) satisfy (13) and (14). The value function 
V*i(p(t) ,Q(t)) and the equilibrium strategy J.Li(P(t) ,Q(t) ,t), must 
satisfy the Bellman-Jacobi equation: 
13 
---------------------------------
(15) rv·¡ (p, Q) =max{p (t) #J.¡-c¡ (#J.¡) 
#J.¡ 
+V·¡Q(p,Q) (-gQ(t)+I:k=I •...n#J.¡¡(P(t) ,Q(t) ,t» 
+V·¡p (p, Q) ( (r+g) p (t) -N/Q (t) ) } 
i=l, ••• ,n 
Consider the right hand side of (15). An interior optimal 
strategy must satisfy #J.¡=[ (p+v·¡Q) / (cs) ]11(1-1). Substituting this 
condition back into (15), and solving the resulting system of 
n partial differential equations for a sYmmetric solution, the 
following characterization of equilibrium strategies and 
profits is obtained: 
e (16) #J.¡ (p , Q) = (koP) 1/(1-1) i=l, ••• ,n 
where ko=«n-1) (sn-1)-lc-l, and 
(17) V·¡ (p, Q) =kdN/r -pQ) where k1=(S-1)/(sn-1). 
It can be checked by direct substitution that (16) and (17) are 
indeed a solution of (15), and that no other sYmmetric solution 
exists. A complete characterization of this equilibrium is 
given in the following: 
Proposition 3: Let Q>O. Then, the set of strategies (17) 
defines the unique sYmmetric closed-loop equilibrium of the 
game. For some initial price Po this equilibrium is stable and 
converges to an steady state: 
14 
[ (n-1) N] 1/.
Q.= (n/g) 1-1/. and N P.=---------
[(sn-1) (r+g)c]I/. (r+g) Q. 
Proof: Our previous considerations have shown that the proposed 
set of strategies defines a closed-loop equilibrium. To show 
that the induced price path p (t) and stock path Q (t) are 
consistent with the consumers' maximization problem notice that 
market demand must coincide with (nJJ¡); hence, as long as 
p(t»o, consumers will be active and demand must satisfy the 
dynamic demand equation. It only rests to show that price and 
stock are non-negative along the equilibrium path and converge 
to (P.,Q.); but this was demonstrated in Proposition 1 for a 
class of supply functions b( ) which includes (16) as a 
particular case.///. 
As an inmediate consequence of the proposition, market 
dynamics share the properties of the perfectly competitive 
case: 
COROLLARY: Along the equilibrium path, price and stock are 
inversely related. 
According to the corollary, proposition 2 also applies to 
the model of this section. Thus, intertemporal price 
discrimination may also be a reason for declining prices in 
young oligopolistic markets. 
15 
Finally, i t is interesting to note that some forms of 
consumers heterogeneity can be easily incorporated into this 
framework. Suppose, for instance, that consumers can be indexed 
by an integer i so that u(X,i)=h(i)lnX, where h(i»O. Suppose 
that there are H(i) consumers of type i, and let' s def ine 
N·=I:¡h(i)H(i). Then, the dynamic demand equation for the market 
is p'(t)=(r+g)p(t)-N·/Q(t), which is similar to equation (13). 
Market dynamics are thus as before. Differences among consumers 
result in consumers with a stronger preference h(i) for the 
good, holding larger quantities of it. 
5.-COMPARATIVE DYNAMICS 
In this section we shift our phocus to markets for stablished 
products, to study how the equilibrium price should react to 
changes in the structural parameters of the modelo Because of 
the similarities already noted, the analysis that follows 
applies to any of the market structures considered in the two 
previous sections. 
Suppose that, initially, the market is in its steady state 
equilibrium. A structural shock may affect the number of firms 
or consumers in the market, or may result in a (monotonous) 
shift of the marginal cost or marginal utility curves. In 
response to an unexpected change in the structure of the model, 
there will be an instantaneous price jump to accommodate price 
to the current stock level. The jump will be followed by a 
process of gradual adjustment along the equilibrium path, as 
the stock level approaches i ts new long-run equilibrium level. 
16 
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It seems natural to label the instantaneous adjustment as 
the short-run reaction of price. If the short-run adjustment 
is larger than the required long-run adjustment, then there is 
price overshoothing. Otherwise, there is price undershooting. 
As it turns out, whether there will be price overshooting or 
price undershooting depends only on the side of the market 
affected by the shock. 
PROPOSITION 4: Suppose (p(O),Q(O»=(PI,QI). Then: 
i) Non-anticipated shocks in either the number of consumers or 
their preferences will result in price overshooting. 
ii) Non-anticipated shocks in either the number of firms or the 
cost function will result in price undershooting. 
PROOF: Let (Pn,Qn) be the new steady state after the shock. 
i) Suppose that (Pn' Qn) > (P8' Q8) (Le., N increases or u' ( ) moves 
to the right). To reach Qn it is necessary to increase Q; since 
p and Q are inversely related, price must be decreasing along 
the equilibrium path. This requires to set a price p>pn. Thus, 
there is price overshooting. If (Pn,Qn)«P8,Q8)' a similar 
argument applies. 
ii) If P8<Pn and Q8>Qn' in order to decrease Q, p must increase 
along the equilibrium path. Thus, price must be set to a level 
p<pn. Furthermore, P:SP8 implies that p will be decreasing. 
Hence, P8<P<Pn' Le., there is price undershooting. If P8>Pn and 
Q8<Qn' a similar argument applies. / / / . 
17 
The scope of the results of proposition 4 is limited. The 
occurrence of zero-probability events violates the rationality 
of the expectations of firms and consumers. The suggestion, 
however, still deserves sorne consideration. In response,to an 
exogenous shock, the short-run change of price may not be 
proportionated to the magnitude of the change required to 
restore the equilibrium in the long-runo There are two factors 
that influence the particular dynamics of price adjustment. 
First, in the short-run, the stock of the good owned by the 
consumers cannot be changed. This forces price to absorb all 
of the short-run impact of the shock. This short-term 
adjustment is similar to the kind of adjustment one would 
expect to observe in a non-durable market with instantaneous 
adjustment. Second, in order to bring the stock level to a new 
steady-state equilibrium, price must gradually change. These 
two factors work independently which explains why, in case of 
a demand shock, the short-run and long-run adjustment of price 
run in opposite directions. 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In summary, we have analized optimal consumer behavior with 
rational expectations in a durable good market¡ sticky price 
demand functions naturally emerge in this contexto 
The fact that consumers, in our model, anticipate future 
prices, does not force price to adjust inmediately to its long 
run equilibrium level. Firms are able to extract sorne 
consumers' surplus through time, thus taking advantage of the 
gradual change in the marginal utility of the durable good. On 
18 
the other hand, consumers' perfect foresight has an influence 
on the price path¡ in order to induce consumers to increase 
their holdings of the good, price has to be kept below the 
current marginal utility of the good. This sets a limit to the 
ability of firms to extract consumers'surplus. 
Durable good markets are often studied under the assumption 
of a perfectly inelastic (zero-one) demando In this context, 
stokey (1979) finds that consumers' expectations impose no 
restriction on the set of equilibria. Our analysis indicates 
that this result does not extend to the case of an elastic 
demando Many durable goods (bulbs, compact-disks or golf balls, 
for instance) may be demanded in quantities greater than unity 
and show a limited durability (which allows for replacement 
sales). In all of these examples, individual demand may show 
some responsiveness to price and, in consequence, expectations 
may playa role in determining the nature of equilibria. 
19 
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APPENDIX A 
To characterize the solution of the consumer's problem, let's 
associate a current value multiplier B(t) with the differential 
equation (1), and define the current value Hamiltonian: 
H(X(t),x(t),B(t»= u(x(t»-p(t)x(t)+B(t) (-gX(t)+x(t» 
Necessary conditions for an optimum are then: 
dH(X,x,B)/dx=-p(t)+B(t)=O 
and 
rB(t)-B' (t)=u' (X(t»-gB(t) 
e 
whenever the constraint s(t)~O is not binding, and s(t)=O 
otherwise. Totally differentiating the two conditions above and 
rearranging terms it follows that, for x(t»o, 
x(t)=gX(t)+[p"(t)-(r+g)p'(t)]/u"(X(t». (The reader is 
referred to Kamien and Schwartz (1981) for a detailed 
discussion of the necessary and sufficient optimality 
conditions for "singular optimal control problems".///. 
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ENDNOTES 
l. See Jorgensen (1985) for a survey of dynamic pricing models. 
2. Durable goods are often studied in the context of an inelastic 
"zero-one" demando Our model allows for consumption of an 
arbitrary amount of a divisible good which depretiates at a 
constant rateo 
3. Bulow (1982) gives some plausible examples of preferences that 
depend on both, current and past consumption¡ he also notes the 
formal equivalence between the two alternative interpretations 
of our modelo 
4. In some cases, heterogeneous consumers can be incorporated 
into the modelo An example is given in section 4. 
5. This formulation can be slightly generalized. Suppose there 
is a second, non-durable, good z(t)¡ let pz=l be the price of z 
and let M be income. Then, assununing that U(X,z)=u(X)+z and 
p(t)x(t)+z(t)<=M, it follows that U(X,z)=u(X)-p(t)x(t)+M. 
6. Ferhstman and Kamien (1987) consider preferences of the form 
U(X,x)=u(X)x-px where u(X)=A-BX and X'(t)=-gX(t)+x(t)¡ they
analize the myopic demand u (X) =p. The corresponding dynamic 
demand is p'(t)=(r+g)p(t)-w(X(t», where 
w(X(t»=gX(t)u'(X(t»+(r+g)u(X(t» is a decreasing function of 
X. Hence, both models yield similar dynamics. 
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